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  This book will examine how Presidents have interpreted the Constitution. The title comes 
from Washington’s early remark that he stood on untrodden ground, and everything he did 
would become a precedent. Indeed it did, and the process continues today. Most Americans do 
not think of the President as the nation’s most important law-interpreter, but he is.1 This role is a 
necessary consequence of the Constitution’s creation of three separate branches, each of which 
interprets the Constitution constantly as it operates, independent of the views of the other two. Of 
course the Supreme Court oversees the interpretations of the other branches episodically, but in 
the case of the presidency, quite infrequently. (I count about 25 major Supreme Court precedents 
on presidential power in the course of over 220 years of our history; they set only loose limits on 
the executive’s interpretive freedom.) 
 Within the executive branch, responsibility for interpreting the Constitution is vested in 
the President—by the vesting clause and by the oath to defend the Constitution that all Presidents 
take (sometimes twice!) as they embark on the office. Although the First Congress could have 
tried to place interpretive authority in an independent Attorney General, it did not do so, leaving 
that officer to offer interpretations that Presidents accept or decline at their pleasure. In modern 
parlance, the President is “the decider” on the meaning of the Constitution, although he receives 
constant advice from within and without the executive branch in making those decisions.   
 Our 44 Presidents have interpreted the Constitution in a pragmatic way that has built on 
the precedents set by their predecessors more than on theories offered up by their lawyers 
(although these theories do often encapsulate the precedents, converging arguments from history 
and law). I am much more interested in the view of the Constitution that is implied by what 
Presidents have done than in official explanations offered by the Presidents or by others in their 
                                                          
1 On January 20, 2017, shall we make that “she”? 
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stead to explain actions taken, except in those instances where the explanation has become an 
important part of the precedent. Freestanding assertions of power not tied to actual decisions do 
not form precedents with any punch.  
 Reviewing our history, I see presidential constitutional interpretation as a process very 
similar to generation of the common law--the accretion of precedent on the basis of past 
decisions in similar cases, adjusted for the facts of the case at hand and present conditions. Five 
factors appear to drive interpretation; they lie more in history and politics than in law as 
conventionally understood:  
1. Personality. Each President sees the Constitution through the lens of his own character and 
experience. Presidents interpret the document in ways that match their temperament (Buchanan’s 
cowardice, Lincoln’s courage, Andrew Johnson’s rigidity). Although affected by the institutions 
that surround the President (all those lawyers), at its heart the process is highly personal.  
2. Politics. A President’s political priorities affect his constitutional interpretations in 
fundamental ways. Some Presidents are much more interested in pressing forward on foreign 
policy (Kennedy, Nixon); others on domestic issues (Lyndon Johnson, Clinton). The core 
constitutional duty faithfully to execute the laws has received widely variant interpretation 
depending on whom Presidents wish to benefit, for example management versus labor during 
strikes. Lamentably, most Presidents have not met this duty vigorously regarding the need to 
benefit the most powerless groups in society, such as the Indians and the freed slaves. Some 
Presidents have committed grievous sins against civil liberties (Wilson, Franklin Roosevelt). 
Overall, most Presidents have not implemented the faithful execution duty in ways that would 
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render them the tribunes of ordinary folk that they so often claim to be. This is because the 
governing coalitions to which they respond omit the powerless. 
3. Predicaments. Of course, no President controls his own agenda more than partially. Fate 
intervenes, as LBJ and Clinton discovered when foreign crises disrupted their domestic plans. 
Urgent predicaments drive constitutional searches for solutions that work today, whatever their 
implications for tomorrow. Facing any crisis, Presidents naturally consider: 
4. Precedents. Presidents view themselves in historical perspective, and are drawn to the 
examples set by their predecessors, who alone among Americans have shared the decisional 
pressures they face. There is comfort in precedential continuity, risk in novelty. Some precedents 
offer to confer legitimacy on a proposed action; others may undermine it. Truman tried 
(unsuccessfully) to invoke Lincoln’s Civil War precedents during the steel seizure; no modern 
President risks court-packing or impoundment.  
5. Pushback. Congress, the public, or (sometimes) the courts react to presidential actions by 
accepting or rejecting them. In this way new constitutional law is made by the joint action of the 
three branches and the people. Acquiescence in a precedent can cement it, as has occurred with 
sole executive agreements. In contrast, the court-packing and impoundment episodes took 
options off the table, apparently permanently. In this relationship, Presidents hold the vital 
advantage of the initiative—they can select the action to which the nation will react.  
 Many of the precedents that I examine concern a President’s interpretation of his own 
powers. Here, operative constitutional law flows from any presidential initiative that is accepted 
by the other branches and the public. Given the presidency’s considerable institutional 
advantages in taking action compared to the other branches, this opportunity to generate new law 
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has immense practical advantages and a troubling capacity for abuse. To what extent is precedent 
binding as law? It does have force in the common law sense that yesterday’s mistakes are not 
commonly repeated (Wilson’s repression in World War I, FDR’s internment in World War II). It 
is also far more likely that Congress and the people will accept a presidential action that has a 
firm base in historic precedent. Precedent thus nudges Presidents to follow familiar courses that 
their predecessors took successfully, instead of choosing something innovative from the menu of 
options that bright advisers might devise.   
 I also consider some presidential interpretations of the powers of Congress and of the Bill 
of Rights that have had important effects on how the Constitution actually operates. For example, 
notwithstanding John Marshall’s magisterial assurances about the scope of the necessary and 
proper clause, Jeffersonian Presidents in the antebellum years routinely vetoed important 
legislation on the basis of a much narrower view of the clause, which was therefore the nation’s 
effective interpretation for much of the period. Wilson’s repression of dissent during World War 
I depended on a crabbed interpretation of the First Amendment, one that the nation has rejected 
since. 
 This process of presidential interpretation supports some conclusions that are relevant to 
current debates. First, Presidents immediately departed from originalist interpretations of the 
Constitution (unless they served a present purpose). Instead, Presidents have been busy making 
the Constitution work in their own day. Second, the operative danger that presidential action 
creates is ordinarily not the assertion of power that is exclusive of the other two branches, 
although the recent terror war had some bad moments of that sort. As in our recent history, 
reaction by the other branches and the people tends to squelch such claims before long. Instead, 
the danger lies in uncontrolled and perhaps uncontrollable presidential initiatives in crisis times 
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that are not asserted to be exclusive of other branches but in which they are ill suited to 
participate, as in the paradigmatic example of the Cuban missile crisis.  
 Enough about process; what is the current state of constitutional law as generated by 
Presidents? Let us run down the main list of presidential powers. First, have we a unitary 
executive branch with the President at its head? No, nor have we ever, nor has any President 
seriously tried to create one. Not even Washington quite fills the bill—he had both Jefferson and 
Hamilton in his original cabinet, after all. True, Presidents do try to run the executive branch, but 
under political constraints that make formal unitariness irrelevant to them. My history focuses 
mostly on what I call the “constitutional cabinet,” the original four officers who have important 
roles in executing the President’s constitutional powers (to these I add attention to some modern 
White House aides, principally the chief of staff and the national security adviser). Presidents 
have picked their battles over control of the core of their own branch, with widely varying 
success depending on their political and managerial skills.  
Presidents have conceded two critical features of unitariness to Congress. One is the 
existence of independent regulatory agencies, in which Presidents have long since acquiesced. 
The other is the early concession to the Senate of a powerful role in blocking nominations and 
controlling patronage. Long before the present dysfunction of the confirmation process, the 
Senate had deeply invaded the prospects of any President to form a unitary executive or to select 
judges that fit his preferences. More successfully, Presidents have maintained the critical power 
of civilian control over the military, but not without some very dangerous struggles, for example 
in the rise of those supreme egotists McClellan and MacArthur. With less fanfare, during the 
early part of the Cold War, Presidents struggled against constant military pressure to take 
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aggressive action, and then struggled against constant military reluctance to take any action after 
the searing experience of Vietnam.  
 Whether Congress and the people acquiesce in or object to presidential actions depends 
on what information is available to them. Presidents have always kept secrets on their own 
authority. For many years, executive privilege assertions against Congress were unusual and 
were resolved through a political process that assumed the routine availability of information, 
unless it met a one of a set of evolving exceptions. Conflict has been sharper in modern times, 
commencing when Joe McCarthy sparked presidential assertions of broad power over executive 
branch information. The sins of Watergate drew attention to the constitutional executive 
privilege that the Supreme Court crafted, but congressional demands for information remain 
subject to the tides of politics.  
More important is the vast expansion of classification of information after World War II, 
which hides much executive activity from everyone. This aspect of the national security state is a 
product of steadily expanding precedents concerning the President’s constitutional authority to 
set classification policy without much input from Congress. Presidents vary in the transparency 
of their regimes, but not as much as their rhetoric often suggests.  
 The power of the President in the legislative process soon departed from the original 
understanding in two fundamental particulars. Under the Federalist Presidents, the constitutional 
power to recommend legislation lay dormant due to traditional fears of “corrupting” the sensitive 
legislators. Jefferson subtly demonstrated the potential for presidential management of 
legislation, but this power remained underdeveloped until the pre-modern presidencies of TR and 
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Wilson awoke it and FDR made it an indispensable part of the presidency. LBJ, the master of 
Congress, demonstrated its ultimate reach and its power to help the oppressed.   
The President’s veto also remained undeveloped until Andrew Jackson transformed it in 
his war against the Bank, while declaring the independence of his interpretive power from that of 
the other branches. Ever since, the veto has given Presidents great power within Congress, which 
tries to craft bills that the President will accept. (Experience soon proved the difficulty of 
override, especially once the party system matured.)  
 Development of the President’s powers within Congress fostered the maturation of the 
President’s important power of interstitial legislation through executive orders that dwell in 
Justice Jackson’s twilight zone, where Congress has neither clearly authorized nor forbidden 
executive action. Not surprisingly, it was the audacious TR who first demonstrated the capacity 
of this power as he added conservation to the list of values that American government was 
committed to pursuing. As the administrative state has grown, the executive order power has 
grown with it as Presidents attempt to harmonize the statutes, constantly testing for political 
acquiescence or disapproval.  
 As everyone knows, foreign policy powers immediately gravitated to the presidential 
office, with its powerful natural advantages in exercising them. Washington himself assumed the 
powers to negotiate treaties in secret, to present them to the Senate for its consent but not advice, 
and to interpret existing treaties.  The sole executive agreement made an immediate appearance, 
as did the power to recognize the true government of another nation. The basic constitutional 
pattern that the President proposes and Congress disposes soon emerged. Congress, reduced to a 
frustrated and reactive stance, got even in its long period of refusing its consent to treaties, 
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capped by breaking Wilson’s heart. As Congress attempted to dictate foreign policy on the eve of 
World War II, FDR showed how a crafty President could dance at the edge of statutes while 
drawing public opinion his way. After the war, the bomb and the Cold War engendered the 
national security establishment that has permanently expanded presidential power.  
 The Constitution’s tension between the war power of Congress and the President’s 
designation as commander in chief began its migration toward an executive center of gravity 
early on, when Jefferson claimed to be deferring to Congress as he pursued the pirates. The 
decisive break was Polk’s deployment of the troops in harm’s way in what he called southern 
Texas and the defenders called Mexico. As the rawboned young Lincoln understood, this put it 
in the power of one man to initiate war through provocation. Lincoln’s own greatest emergency 
actions in the cauldron of Civil War, the suspension of habeas corpus and the Emancipation 
Proclamation, were both legally sound in my view. The question ever since has been their utility 
as precedents for crises less stark. The period through World War I saw constant presidential 
adventuring with the troops, with TR taking the palm by detaching Panama from Colombia for 
his canal.  
The stakes rose after World War II, when the threat of Armageddon emboldened 
Presidents. Kennedy’s unilateral conduct of the Cuban missile crisis leaves us to wonder if we 
must allow Presidents to serve as temporary dictators with the fate of the nation or the world in 
their hands, whenever time and circumstance grant no alternatives. Truman’s commitment of 
troops to Korea without Congress stands as the modern test of the limits to initiate conventional 
hostilities unilaterally. Later Presidents appear to have learned some lessons from the tribulations 
Truman encountered as the war went along. Thus, the Presidents Bush sought congressional 
authorization for the Gulf wars (over the objections of the obdurate Cheney). LBJ got his initial, 
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fuzzy endorsement for hostilities in Vietnam, but his record of unilateralism and duplicity in 
conducting the war lost the support of both Congress and the people. Richard Nixon, by doubling 
down on both of LBJ’s sins, brought on both his own demise and the congressional risorgimento 
that asserted control of the imperial presidency in so many fields. 
In succeeding decades, presidential power showed its resilience by recovering from the 
triple traumas of Vietnam, Watergate, and legislation. The junior President Bush was even 
allowed to forget the lesson of Vietnam by fomenting an unnecessary war through deception. In 
the more necessary war, the one against terror, Bush followed his instincts and his advisors into 
claims of exclusive executive power that were eventually rejected by both Congress and the 
Supreme Court. Once shorn of early excesses, claims to executive powers of detention and 
military trial of terror suspects appear to have stabilized legally. President Obama has followed 
the precedents of Bush sober on these issues. The question of interrogation—torture—has not 
settled into any reliable precedent, despite wide rejection of the early Bush practices and 
Obama’s retreat from them. Obama has proved more aggressive in pursuing terrorists than many 
would have expected, with his expansion of targeted killings. These two Presidents have been 
groping for the most effective approach and calling it constitutional. Congress and the public 
follow gingerly along.  
Reviewing all this history, no one should be surprised that an officer who is so largely 
allowed to define his own powers would do so in an expansive way. The scope of permissible 
change in the precedents has narrowed somewhat over time, as it does for accretive judicial 
precedent. Yet the capacity for generation of new lines of precedent is still there, as the terror 
war so clearly demonstrates. Compared to precedent generated by the other two, institutionally 
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structured, branches, the personal generation of precedent by Presidents is more labile and far 
speedier.  
Forty-four Presidents have trodden a lot of ground, and in places it is well-packed and 
solid. How will the forty-fifth President interpret her powers? Where will she step out onto 
untrodden ground? Will her gender inflect her interpretations, as the race of our first black 
President may have inflected his? I don’t know; let’s schmooze about it.      
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